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THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE:
1880-1965
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
fundamental changes in economic thought revolutionized the theory of
corporate finance, leading to changes in its legal regulation. The changes
were massive, and this branch of financial analysis and law became
virtually unrecognizable to those who had practiced it earlier. In brief, the
theory of corporate finance went through the same marginalist revolution
that divides classical political economy from neoclassical economics.
The waning days of classical corporate finance were represented in
the work of the Progressive "Muckrakers," who wrote detailed exposures of
financial scandals that occurred during the Gilded Age,1 calling attention to
what they saw as an indefensible maldistribution of wealth and power in the
United States.2 The muckrakers' principal target was the large American
business corporation, then of relatively recent vintage, as well as the men
who controlled them, including John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and
railroad magnates Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jay Gould. For example,
Charles Francis Adams wrote a series of articles in the North American
Review exposing the great Erie Railroad stock scandal of the 1860's.3
*. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor or Law, Univ. of Iowa. The dates given in
the title are more-or-less arbitrary. At the beginning, the first major work of English
neoclassical marginalism was Arthur Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political
Economy (1871). At the end, Eugene F. Fama's doctoral dissertation, often
credited with assembling the data and proofs that created the modern efficient
capital market hypothesis (ECMH), was published as Eugene F. Fama, The
Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J.Bus. 34 (1965). See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control,
1. Roughly 1870-1900, and named after a book by Mark Twain about the
financial excesses and inequalities of the period. Mark Twain and Charles Dudley
Warner, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today (1873).
2. See Walter M. Brasch, Forerunners of Revolution: Muckrakers and the
American Social Conscience (1990); Arthur Ekirch, The Decline of American
Liberalism 58-63 (1955); Louis Filler, The Muckrakers: Crusaders for American
Liberalism (1968).
3. See Adams, The Railroad System, 104 N.Am.Rev. 476 (1867); Adams,
Legislative Control over Railway Charters, 1 Am.L.Rev. 451 (1867); Adams, The
Erie Railroad Row, 3 Am.L.Rev. 41 (1868); Adams, Railroad Inflation, 108
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Three decades later Ida Tarbell's History of Standard Oil excoriated the
financial dealings of John D. Rockefeller and his corporation.4
The story of the Erie Railroad became a model application of
classical corporate finance theory used to expose a great scandal. Here a
giant corporation robbed both stock purchasers and creditors by
committing financial fraud through the issuance of "watered" stock.
Classical corporate finance theory rested on a model of absolute
unity of the corporation and its shareholders. Shareholders were regarded
as in control and were directly liable for shortcomings, although they could
be duped by management. Within this classical conception of corporate
finance a corporation was valued by the amount of capital that the
proprietors, or founding shareholders, paid in when a corporation was
formed or when additional shares were issued. Stock was said to be
"watered" when its stated value exceeded the amount of capital that had
actually been paid in to the corporation. For example, at the time a
corporation formed its shareholders might issue 10,000 shares of stock at a
stated par value of $10 per share. Disclosure of these numbers to future
investors, whether creditors or subsequent share purchasers, operated as
a guarantee that 10 multiplied by 10,000, or $100,000, had been paid in to
the capital of the corporation. This amount was presumed to be the
corporation's value. Further, it assured creditors that there was a fund that
they could turn to in the event of a default. If the product of the number of
shares and the stated par value exceeded the amount of capital actually
paid in then the stock was said to be "watered" by the amount of the
excess. Under classical finance theory, when stock was watered both
minority or subsequently purchasing shareholders as well as creditors
could be duped into thinking that a corporation was much more valuable
than it really was.
William W. Cook, author of the most prominent corporate law
treatise of the late nineteenth century, defended this traditional conception
of par value and explained the problem of "watered" stock this way:
A share of stock is supposed, in theory, to represent its par value in
N.Am.Rev. 130 (1869); Adams, A Chapter of Erie, 109 N.Am.Rev 30-106 (1870);
Adams, Railway Problems in 1869, 110 N.Am.REV 116 (1970); Adams, Railway
Commissions, 2 J.Soc.Sci 233-236 (1870); Adams, The Government and the
Railroad Corporations, 112 N. Am.Rev 31 (1871). On Adams' career in railroad
regulation, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, ch. 1 (1984).
4. Ida M. Tarbell, History of the Standard Oil Company (1904).
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money or money's worth, paid in or to be paid in to the corporation.
...
All stock which has been issued as paid-up stock, but whose full par
value has not been paid in to the corporation in money or money's
worth, is watered to the extent that the par value exceeds the value
actually paid in.5
Cook, whose views represented the ideology of the New York
corporate bar during its late nineteenth century ascendancy,6 largely
reconstituted the publicly traded business corporation as a routine
investment device for shareholders, rather than as a special prerogative of
the state as earlier corporate law writing had tended to do. As such Cook's
treatise was strongly focused on the rights of stockholders and their
potential abuse at the hands of unscrupulous managers, whose interests
he tended to see as inconsistent with those of the corporation.7 It was
5. William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders and General
Corporation Law '21 at 28-29 (2d ed. 1889).
On Cook, Alfred F. Conard, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A
Belated Review of William W. Cook's Publications on Corporations, 93 Mich.L.Rev.
1724 (1995). On Cook's life see the University of Michigan Law School's website,
http://www.law.umich.edu/library/cook/Pages/default.aspx. Cook's gift of his entire
fortune to that law school enabled the University of Michigan to build its law school
Quadrangle.
6. See Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterprise, 1870-1920," in Professions and Professional Ideologies in
America, 1730-1940 (Gerald L. Geison, ed. 1983); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: the Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (1992);
William Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in
America, 1886-1937 (1998).
7. See Conard, note __ at 1726-1727. Writing during a period of widespread
stock scandal, Cook said:
Corporations, with their vast capital stock, their great income, their
rapidly changing personal property, and their large purchases and
sales, have proved to be a temptation which corporate officers are
too often unable to withstand. These companies have been found
to be efficient instruments of fraud, speculation, plunder, and
illegal gain. In these latter days the robbery and spoliation of
corporations and stockholders by the corporate directors and
managers have been systematized into well-known methods of
proceeding, and the carrying out of such plans has become a
profession and an accomplishment. The skill, audacity,
experience, and talent of the highest order of administrative ability
have reduced to a certainty the methods of diverting profits,
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largely the eventual failure of Cook's ideal that led to the separation of
ownership and corporate control that Berle and Means described in their
New Deal book on the business corporation.8
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the classical view of
corporate valuation in 1889, the "meaning of the word 'value,' and the basis
on which the idea of value rests" is the representation made on the stock
certificate of that which has been contributed. The stock certificate
stands in the hands of the subscriber for so much as, and no more
than, the amount actually paid upon it.9
Classical corporate finance theory was designed to be applied
under common law rules of contract and fraud. Computing corporate value
under the theory was largely a matter of bookkeeping. As a result the rules
were regarded as self-executing, in the sense that any reasonable
manager could comply with them and challenges could be made when
appropriate in a common law court. If the paid-in capital had taken the
form of cash one could easily determine whether the stated par value of
outstanding shares was supported by cash that had actually been paid in.
Difficulties in judgment could arise if the payments had been made in
noncash property such as real estate or other productive assets or
intellectual property rights, for there could be questions about
overvaluation. However, the common law of fraud was well designed to
deal with such deceptions.10 The courts tended to give the incorporators
capital, and even the existence of the corporation itself, to the
enrichment of the corporate managers and their co-conspirators.
Corporations become insolvent and stockholders lose their
investments, while individuals become millionaires. Illegitimate
gains are secured and enormous fortunes are amassed by the few
at the expense of the defrauded, but generally helpless,
stockholders.
William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders and General
Corporation Law 667 (2d ed. 1889).
8. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property 159 (1932).
9. Appeal of Lehigh Ave. Rwy. Co., 18 A. 498, 499, 129 Pa. 405 (1889).
10. Gillett v Chicago Title & Trust Co., 230 Ill 373, 82 N.E. 891, 904-05 (1907)
(rights to an unwritten play and several unpatented inventions deemed valueless
by court, so that stock received for these intangibles "remained wholly unpaid");
Garden City Sand Co. v. Crematory Co., 205 Ill. 42, 68 N.E. 724 1903) ("nearly
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the benefit of the doubt if the evaluation had been made in good faith, even
though subsequently proven wrong. As the Supreme Court observed in an
1886 decision:
If it were proved that actual fraud was committed in the payment of
the stock, and that the complainant had given credit to the company
from a belief that its stock was fully paid, there would undoubtedly
be substantial ground for the relief asked. But where the charter
authorizes capital stock to be paid in property, and the shareholders
honestly and in good faith put in property instead of money in
payment of their subscriptions, third parties have no ground of
complaint. The case is very different from that in which
subscriptions to stock are payable in cash, and where only a part of
the installments has been paid. In that case there is still a debt due
to the corporation, which, if it become insolvent, may be
sequestered in equity by the creditors, as a trust fund liable to the
payment of their debts. But where full-paid stock is issued for
property received, there must be actual fraud in the transaction to
enable creditors of the corporation to call the stockholders to
account. A gross and obvious overvaluation of property would be
strong evidence of fraud.11
This self-executing nature of classical corporate finance theory was
essential if the financial relationships among a corporation's managers,
shareholders and creditors were to be governed by common law rules in
courts of general jurisdiction. In the nineteenth century states were
generally loathe to create regulatory agencies. But during the Gilded Age
business corporations grew very large in terms of revenue, number and
nature of shareholders. Further, their financial dealings grew far more
complex than anything known in the earlier part of the century, save for
worthless" patent valued at over $50,000 established that stock was watered:
"Money or money's worth" means cash or its equivalent. If the directors
saw fit to accept property in lieu of cash, they could only take it at its fair
cash market value, if it was property which had an ascertainable market
value. If it had no ascertainable market value, then the only price at which
the directors could purchase it was such price as could be realized by
selling it to others for cash.
11. See, e.g., Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 344-345 (1886).
See also Boynton v. Hatch, 2 Sickels 224, 47 N. Y. 225 (N.Y. 1872) (creditor
entitled to prove that incorporators grossly overstated value of paid in property);
Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. 413 (1856) (contribution of coal mining property at its
appraised value was proper so long as no reason existed for thinking that the
appraisal had been fraudulently conducted or obtained).
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some railroad corporations.
The number of watered stock scandals increased dramatically
during the early twentieth century, culminating in a major wave during the
period 1917-1920, and another one just at the onset of the Great
Depression.
In the meanwhile, nearly every state responded with
regulatory legislation. Between 1911 and 1931, 47 out of 48 states passed
"blue sky" statutes, of which more will be said later.12 Given that general
business incorporation statutes had been around for well over half a
century by this time, the sudden passage of these laws in a brief period
seems perplexing. The statutes generally required registration of securities
and sales personnel, the provision of detailed financial information to
prospective purchasers, as well as a state official's prior approval of new
stock offerings.13
One explanation of the sudden growth of blue sky laws during this
period is that they were special interest legislation intended to protect
mainly small banks who were losing investments in the form of savings
deposits to securities, and thus losing profits to underwriters. The banks
themselves were regulated by state law limiting their own business
severely, and the blue sky laws were intended to make the securities less
attractive.14 Others have argued that the statutes were nothing more than
long overdue reforms.15 Or, relatedly, they may have been a response to
12. See discussion infra, text at notes __; and see Paul G. Mahoney, the
Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L.Econ. 229
(2003); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70
Tex. L. Rev. 347 (1991); and see Louis Loss & Edward M. Cowett, Blue Sky Laws
(1958).
13. See Mahoney, id. at 230-232 (detailing several provisions and providing a
table organized by adoption date and provisions).
14. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws,
70 Tex. L. Rev. 347, 365 (1991). Cf. Mahoney, note __, which sees a much more
complex set of causes, mainly political, in which the relative power of small bank
lobbying seemed to affect the type of statute that was passed but numerous other
factors were important as well.
See also George Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, 44 Acct. Rev. 515 (1969) (arguing that the regulation was inefficient
because the cost of disclosure requirements exceed their value); George J.
Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA (1976) (similar).
15. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J.Corp.L. 1 (1983). See also Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall
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the recent rise of the modern national securities markets, which required
investor confidence,16 but also entailed that shareholders were even less
involved in corporate affairs than they had been before, and thus needed
some more protection from the state.17
I believe that the "watered" stock scandals of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century and the subsequent calls for increased
regulation were a natural result of a different way of thinking about the
financing and value of the business corporation. The source of this
revision was the marginalist, or neoclassical, revolution in economic
thought. The classical theory had seen corporate finance as a backward
looking, relatively self-executing inquiry based on the classical theory of
value. By contrast, neoclassical value theory was forward looking and as a
result a much more realistic way of assessing a corporation's value; but it
also required more prediction and interpretation, and thus was subject to
more abuse. That possibility led the states first and later the federal
government to respond with regulatory legislation.
While marginalism effected a sweeping change in regulatory
attitudes toward the corporation, the changes in the basic theory of
corporate behavior, and thus of finance, were at least as striking. The
marginalist revolution turned the corporation into a rational actor intent on
maximizing value. Within this model the idiosyncratic preferences of not
only shareholders but also of creditors and even managers became largely
irrelevant. Or to say it differently, the neoclassical concept of the
corporation did not merely separate ownership from control; it separated
corporate decision making from all human preference whatsoever, unless
Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern
Corporate Finance 19, 20, 38 (1982).
16. Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial
Securities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus.His.Rev. 105 (1955). See also Naomi R.
Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "Corporate Governance and the Plight of
Minority Shareholders in the United States before the Great Depression 125, in
Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History (Edward L.
Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, eds. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006).
17. See John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: the Roles of Law and
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001); Mark J.
Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53
Stan.L.Rev. 539, 585-587 (2000); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: the Rise of
the Large Industrial Corporation in America 16-18 (1997); Alfred D. Chandler,
Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 144-145 (1990). See also
Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: the Political Roots of American
Corporate Finance (1994).
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those preferences were simply asserted to be maximization of value.
Within the neoclassical model the separate human identities of
shareholders or even managers came to matter only under the rubric of
"agency costs," which were regarded as nothing more than an imperfection
in the neoclassical corporate ideal.
The Classical Theory of Corporate Finance
Before the twentieth century corporate finance was regulated
mainly by the common law of contract and fraud. Further, the substantive
rules of finance were distinctly "classical," in the sense that they borrowed
their ideas from the classical political economists -- mainly Adam Smith,
David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill. The principal difference between the
classicists and the neoclassicists that followed them is that for the former
value was measured objectively based on historical averages, while for
neoclassicists it was subjective and based on future expectations.
The classicists believed that value was not a function of human
desire, but rather of cost, which consisted mainly of the labor that went into
something. The defining characteristic of this theory of value is that it was
backward looking in time. One measured value by asking what had been
contributed. Any time one tried to take more out than the historical
contribution, the effect was to weaken the firm and perhaps eventually
send it to ruin. As Adam Smith once stated, "The real price of everything,
what everything really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil
and trouble of acquiring it.... 18 That is, one started with raw materials and
any additional value added was the cost of the labor that went into it. For
the business firm value then consisted of the firm's capital plus the added
value provided by labor.19
The paradigm example of classical value theory applied to policy

18. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations 13 ([1776] reprint edition: Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952).
19. See also id. at 563:
[T]he value of [gold and silver] has, in all ages and nations, arisen
chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen from the very
small quantities of them which nature has any where deposited in one
place, from the hard and intractable substance with which she has almost
every where surrounded those small quantities, and consequently from the
labour and expence which are every where necessary in order to
penetrate and get at them.
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was the wage-fund doctrine. David Ricardo, who wrote mainly in the early
nineteenth century, argued that "The value of a commodity, or the quantity
of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative
quantity of labour which is necessary for its production...."20 As a result,
If the corn is to be divided between the farmer and the labourer, the
larger the proportion that is given to the latter, the less will remain
for the former. So if cloth or cotton goods be divided between the
workman and his employer, the larger the proportion given to the
former, the less remains for the latter.21
Under the wage-fund doctrine the amount of wages that could be
paid in the current period was always a function of the amount of "surplus"
that remained from the previous period. The classical idea of a wages fund
was highly intuitive. For example, the farmer working his field this year
necessarily had to live off that which he had produced during the prior year.
If nothing was left over he would starve before he brought the current crops
to harvest.22 The moral that the classicists drew is that the rate of wages to
be paid in the current period could not exceed the amount in a "fund" that
represented the accumulated surplus capital of the previous years. This
fund then had to be divided among workers.23 Any attempt to pay more
would deplete the fund and impair the firm's capital.
Today we are inclined to see the wage-fund doctrine as silly and
myopically backward looking, but that is only because we are conditioned
by a lifetime of looking at the economic world though a forward looking
neoclassical lens. Clearly, the value of wages does not depend on the size
of a historical fund but rather on the employer's prediction of how much
value an additional worker will add to her profits. If the incremental
contribution of a laborer is $10 per hour, then any wage up to $10 an hour
will be profitable for the employer.

20. David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 11 [3d ed.
1821] (reprinted as vol. 1 of Piero Sraffa ed., The Works and Correspondence of
David Ricardo (Cambridge University Press, 1951).
21. Id. at 35.
22. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1780-1860, at
ch. 16 (1991).
23. See, e.g., William G. Sumner, "Protective Taxes and Wages," 136 N. Am.
Rev. 270, 271 (1883) "[c]hanges in rates of wages can only be produced by
changes in the amount of capital distributable as wages, or by changes in the
number of persons competing for wages."
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But that distinctly "marginalist" way of assessing value was
unknown to the classicists. Yale political economist William Graham
Sumner, one of the staunchest defenders of the wage-fund doctrine,
berated the emerging marginal theory of wages for suggesting "that a man
who was tilling the ground in June could eat the crop he expected to have
in September, or that a tailor could be wearing the coat which he was
making."24 Within twenty years of Sumner's comment, however, the wagefund doctrine was widely regarded as completely exploded, replaced with
the idea that the marginal rate of wages is driven mainly by the anticipated
marginal rate of contribution that an employee makes to his employer. In
Britain, John Stuart Mill repudiated the doctrine in 1869 and all of the
British marginalists rejected it.25 In the United States MIT economist
Francis Walker also repudiated the doctrine in the 1870s.26 Most other
United States economists fell in line behind him before the end of the
century.27
The classical theory of corporate finance was based on analogous
principles. The rise of the modern American business corporation began
during the Jackson era with the development of the first general business
incorporation statutes. The thrust of these statutes was to change the
status of the business corporation from a special prerogative or franchise of
the sovereign, such as a public utility or transportation service, to an
ordinary and typical method of doing business.28
24. William G. Sumner, "Wages," in Collected Essays in Political and Social
Science 36, 50 (1885).
25. John Stuart Mill, "Book Review," in 5 Collected Works 680 (J. Robson ed.
1967) see Robert B. Ekelund, "A Short-Run Classical Model of Capital and Wages:
Mill's Recantation of the Wages Fund," 28 Oxford Econ. Papers 66 (1976). See
also Walter Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy 257-258 (1871);
Alfred Marshall, "The Theory of Business Profits," 1 Q. J. Econ. 477 (1887);
Marshall, "Wages and Profits," 2 Q. J. Econ. 218 (1888); Marshall, Principles of
Economics 567 (1890).
26. Francis Walker, "The Wage-Fund Theory," 120 N. Am. Rev. 84, 102
(1875); see also Walker, The Wages Question 142-144, 405-406 (1876).
27. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379, 435 (1988). This included John Bates Clark,
perhaps the leading technical economist in the United States at this time. See
John Bates Clark, "The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages," 4 Publications
Am. Econ. Assn. 39, 49 (1889).
28. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at Chs. 1-6.
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The corporation was a "person" in the eyes of the law, and
eventually even under the United States Constitution.29 This meant that it
owned its own assets and carried its own liability, posted its earnings and
disbursements to its own account, made decisions in its own name about
the extent to which surplus would be paid out as dividends to shareholders
or invested for future production, borrowed money for future development
in its own name, and appeared in court in its own name as both plaintiff
and defendant. Shareholders were owners who could come and go, but
the corporation as an economic entity was intended to be stable.
The classical theory of corporate finance was beguilingly simple
and began with the premise that the corporation was a "person" whose
financial resources and obligations should be treated no differently than the
ledger or bank account of a biological person. Consistent with the classical
theory, the value of a corporation was thought to be the amount that had
been paid in in the past, much like a person's worth is a function of
historically obtained assets. Thus the general incorporation statutes
typically specified that a business firm could incorporate only upon
payment into the corporation of a specified amount of capital.30 If the
declared par value of all the issued shares was significantly greater than
the paid in capital the stock was said to be "watered," a term that derived
from ranchers' practice of salting and overwatering cattle in order to
increase their weight prior to sale.31 Watering of stock most typically
occurred when the incorporators exaggerated the value of property that
was contributed to the corporation at the time of its formation.
Both the common law and the early general incorporation acts
approached the problem of watered stock by removing limited shareholder
liability to one degree or another.32 Most famously, in 1824 Justice Story
riding circuit developed the "trust fund" doctrine, which was adopted by the
29. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(corporation a "person" for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment). See also
Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __, Ch. 4; Morton J. Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited:
the Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1985).
30. See, e.g., Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study of the
Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 at 144150 (1941; rev. ed. 1969) (focusing on Massachusetts).
31. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine, 32 J.Corp.L. 33, 91 n. 293 (2006)
32. On the progression of legal doctrine, see Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __
at 49-64.
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Supreme Court a half century later.33 The doctrine provided that a fictional
trust existed against the assets of shareholders who paid less into the
corporation than the declared value indicated. In short, stockholders could
face personal liability to the extent of any shortfall between stated and
actual paid-in value. Several states provided for some variation of the
same thing by statute.34 For example, the highly influential New York
General Incorporation Act of 1848 assessed double liability against
shareholders when actual paid in capital was less than the stated value.35
The economic basis of the watered stock doctrine was the same as
that of the Wage fund theory previously described: value must be
measured by that which has been previously invested. As Charles Francis
Adams noted in one of his many rhetorical exposes of the railroad watered
stock scandals of the 1860's:
It is an elementary principle of political economy, that all wealth
comes from the soil; neither human industry nor human ingenuity
can produce any addition to the material possessions of mankind
except from the earth.
As a result, "The sum total . . . of the wealth of any community and of
the whole world consists of all that which it has extracted from the earth
enriched by any value that may have been added to it."36
Beginning with this classical and backward-looking premise about
the nature of value, Adams attacked the increasingly popular railroad
practice of paying stock dividends, which increased the stated par value of
total outstanding shares without actually increasing the amount of capital
that had been invested in the company.37 Through the stock dividend, the
33. Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (1824). See also
Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873) (adopting trust fund doctrine).
34. These included New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, as well as
others. See Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought," 76 Geo. L. J. 1593, 1655 (1988).
35. 1848 N.Y. Laws, ch. 40. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __, Ch. 5.
See also Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation,
1784-1855 at 192 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: the
Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 208 (1985).
36. Adams, Railroad Inflation, supra note __ at 130-131.
37. Id. at 138-139. Actually, even under classical theory stock dividends
watered the stock only if they were in excess of additional capital that the
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stated capital of the company increased by the par value of the additional
shares. Adams then praised the recently enacted Illinois Constitution for
writing a special provision prohibiting railroads from issuing stock except for
"money, labor or property actually received."38
At the turn of the century most states had either statutes or
constitutional provisions prohibiting shares from being distributed to
shareholders unless the full stated par value of each share had been paid
into the corporation.39 As William Cook noted, the problem of stock
watering was made acute by the law of corporate limited liability, which he
staunchly defended.40 Limited liability generally entailed that creditors
could not look to the personal assets of shareholders in the event that
corporate debtors defaulted and had insufficient resources to pay their
debts. Cook noted that modern limited liability had permitted the modern
securities market to come into existence. Without it, "the public would not
dare to buy stocks, because they would be liable for corporate debts." As a
result of limited liability "we find in some American corporations over
100,000 stockholders -- total strangers to each other, and scattered all over
the world." Indeed, as Cook acknowledged, this very fact had permitted
the "vast aggregations of capital which have revolutionized modern
industry."41
One result of limited liability, however, was that creditors could turn
only to the corporation in the event of default. They had to rely on the
value of the corporation itself, rather than its human shareholders, in
determining creditworthiness. Further, the value of the corporation was
seen as nothing other than "the money actually paid for the stock."42 Cook
strongly supported the state blue sky laws, which prevented corporate
promoters from selling stock that represented no value except the blue sky.
The statues required a state agency to approve stock issues before they

corporation accumulated and designated for that purpose.
38. Ill. Const., Art. XI, '13 (1869). See Adams, The Government and the
Railroad Corporations, 112 N.Am.Rev. 31, 52 (1871).
39. See Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Corporations
'3903 (1895) [3d ed. '3918, 1927).
40. On the development of limited liability in American corporate law, see H.
Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at ch. 5.
41. Cook, "Watered Stock" -- Commissions -- "Blue Sky Laws" -- Stock
Without Par Value, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 584 (1921).
42. Id.
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could be marketed.43
No state corporation law found stock to be watered merely because
the capital originally paid in had subsequently become worthless.44 The
decisive number was the value of the property at the time it had been paid
in. Under the "trust fund" approach to limited shareholder liability,45 the
stated amount of capital was a fund upon which creditors were entitled to
rely. If the fund as originally paid in was smaller than stated, creditors
could rely on the personal assets of shareholders to make up the
difference.46
However, the doctrine was subject to one important
exception, which suggested an understanding that value and paid in capital
43. Id. at 591.
44. E.g., Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 346-347 (1886). See
also 2 John C. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 799 (1937).
45. See discussion supra, text at notes __.
46. See, e.g., Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104, 114 (1892) (settlement of
claims as between corporation and its shareholders did not preclude creditors from
seeking to attach the shareholders' assets); Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417 (1891)
(construing Kentucky provision that made incorporating stockholders personally
liable for the value of unpaid installments:
The stock of a corporation is supposed to stand in the place of actual
property of substantial value, and as being a convenient method of
representing the interest of each stockholder in such property, and to the
extent to which it fails to represent such value it is either a deception and
fraud upon the public, or an evidence that the original value of the
corporate property has become depreciated. The market value of such
shares rises with an increase in the value of the corporate assets, and falls
in case of loss or misfortune, whereby the value of such assets is
impaired; and the increase of value of such stock is taken to represent
either an appreciation in value of the company's property beyond the par
value of the original shares, or so much money paid to the corporation as
is represented by such shares. If it be once admitted that a corporation
may issue stock without receiving a consideration therefor, and where it
does not represent actual or substituted value in corporate assets, there is
apparently no limit to the extent to which the original stock may be
`watered,' except the caprice of the stockholders. While an agreement that
the subscribers or holders of stock shall never be called upon to pay for
the same may be good as against the corporation itself, it has been
uniformly held by this court not to be binding upon its creditors.
See H. Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at 49-55.
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were not precisely the same: creditors were entitled to make independent
judgments of corporate value and would be held to the consequences.
Thus, for example, if a creditor knew that the capital had not been fully paid
in but loaned money anyway, he implicitly had valued the corporation by
some other means than its actual paid in capital. He could not then go
after the personal assets of shareholders in the event of the corporation's
insolvency.47
The Marginalist Revolution
The term "watered" stock is quaint and largely obsolete today.
Most shares are issued with no stated par value, or perhaps a very small
nominal par value such as $1 per share. While exaggerated valuations are
still a problem, they are rarely tied to the value of what was paid in when a
corporation was first formed, except in the case of very young corporations
or those that have not yet started doing business.
Rather, the
exaggerations come from material misstatements about the firm's
prospects, including assets, liabilities, as well as changes in markets that
could materially affect a firm's future earnings.
As a matter of actual incentives, prospective shareholders have
undoubtedly always made investment decisions based on their
expectations about future earnings, and prospective creditors have
certainly made similar calculations with respect to loans, particularly if they
are unsecured. The problem was that classical political economy and
classical finance theory did not account for these forward looking elements
of human behavior. Indeed, the classical theory of value lacked any
significant behavioral element whatsoever.
For example, one also
supposes that an employer in the early nineteenth century who knew
nothing of theoretical economics made the decision to hire an additional
worker in just the way that employers do today; namely, by considering
how much added value the employer could be expected to produce in
relation to costs. But the wage-fund doctrine48 entirely ignored such
subjective, forward looking elements of valuation.
Marginalism actually entered Anglo-American thought as a
philosophical theory. The first marginalists were utilitarians concerned with
the problem of how individuals and groups maximize their utility, or

47. Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 347 (1886) ("The plaintiff
had placed no reliance upon the supposed paid-up capital of the company on the
increased shares, and therefore has no cause of complaint by reason of their
subsequent recall.").
48. See discussion supra, text at notes __.

16

Hovenkamp, Marginalism & Corporate Finance, 1880-1965
July, 2011

happiness. John Stuart Mill, one of the first great English utilitarians and
also a political economist, developed a purely hedonistic theory of human
value in which pleasure and the absence of pain were the only measures of
happiness, and Mill tied utilitarianism to purely individual preferences.49
This association of "value" with "preference" was in fact a sharp break with
the classical theory of value and signalled the beginning of the end for
classical political economy. Nevertheless, Mill himself remained quite
hostile toward marginalism in economic analysis.50 Late in his life,
however, when confronted with the glaring inconsistencies between the
marginalism in his philosophical thought and his continued adherence to
the wage-fund doctrine he completely repudiated the doctrine.51
Hints of marginalism in economic analysis stretch back to the
beginning of the nineteenth century and even a little earlier.52 The one
British writer whose work clearly presaged marginalist economics was
Jeremy Bentham, whose work on utility theory included a concept of
declining, or marginal utility, in the 1790s. The notions of declining
marginal utility of income and the value of marginal deterrence in criminal
49. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863); id., Ch. 2:
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what
makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure,
except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of
two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have
experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of
the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so
far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be
attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for
any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so
far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
50. See Jeff Lipkes, Religion and the Reception of Marginalism in Britain, 26
Forum for Social Economics 21 (2007); N.B. de Marchi, Mill and Cairnes and the
Emergence of Marginalism in England, 4(2) Hist.Pol.Econ. 344 (1972).
51. See Mill, "Book Review," note ___; and Ekelund, note __. Mill died four
years later.
52. One prominent example on the Continent is Augustin Cournot, whose
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth was
published in French in 1838 and contained well developed theories of marginal
cost, marginal revenue and even monopoly profit maximization.
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law were both developed in Bentham's Principles and his Theory of
Legislation.53 However, Bentham did not carry his observations over into
formal economics and never developed theories of marginal cost or
theories of economic value based on marginalism.
Marginalism emerged as a central tool of economic analysis in the
early 1870's. Englishman William Stanley Jevons and Austrian Carl
Menger, working separately, published books that sought to combine
philosophical marginal utility theory with classical economics. Jevons'
Theory of Political Economy (1871)54 disputed the notion that was nearly
sacred to the classicists that value depended on the amount of labor that
had gone into something. Rather, "value depends entirely on utility," which
was a purely subjective notion and could be totally unrelated to the amount
of previous investment.55 "[W]e have only to trace out carefully the natural
laws of the variation of utility, as depending upon the quantities in our
possession, in order to arrive at a satisfactory theory of exchange," Jevons
concluded. His Theory developed the economic notion of diminishing
marginal utility -- the more of something a person already has, the less she
will be willing to pay for an additional unit. From this Jevons also
developed the conception of equation of utilities -- that a person applying
his money to numerous commodities will purchase an amount of each up
to the point that he derives the same marginal utility from all.56
Carl Menger's Principles of Economics (1871)57 was less influential
in the United States than Jevons' work, since Menger stood outside the
British classical tradition. However, a large group of American graduate
53. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
[1789] (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds 1970); Bentham, The Theory of Legislation
[posthumous] (R. Hildreth transl. 1864).
54. A.S. Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (1871; 3d ed. 1888). Alfred
Marshall also deserves part of the credit. See 1 The Early Economic writings of
Alfred Marshall 2 (J.K. Whitaker, ed. 1975). For a thoughtful perspective on the
rise of marginalism, see D.E. Moggridge, Maynard Keynes: An Economist's
Biography 84-86 (1992). John Bates Clark in the United States probably came to
his marginalism independently. See J. Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth, chs. 4-5
(1886); J. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 870 (1954).
55. Id. 3d ed. at 1.
56. "[W]hen the person remains satisfied with the distribution he has made, it
follows that .. . an increment of commodity would yield exactly as much utility in
one use as in another . . . . Id., 3d ed. at 59-60.
57. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (1871).
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students in political economy who went abroad for graduate study in the
late nineteenth century ended up on the Continent, especially in Germany,
and many of them studied Menger.58
The two characteristics of marginalism that made it so different from
the thought of the classicists were its subjective, behaviorist definition of
value and its forward rather than backward looking perspective. The
classicists had been convinced that value must be a function of scarcity
and the amount of labor that went into something -- two things that could
be measured objectively. But the neoclassicists realized that this could
hardly be the whole story. As British neoclassicist Lionel Robbins pointed
out, rotten eggs might be rare and cost just as much to produce as good
eggs. But even one rotten egg might be more than anyone wants, and as
a result they are not particularly valuable.59 The essential ingredient
missing from classical theory was subjective desire, whose intersection
with scarcity created value. This led to Robbins famous behaviorist
definition of economics as "the science which studies human behavior as a
relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses."60
This important behavioral aspect of economics so changed the
focus of economics so as to make it a social science, rather than a natural
science as the classicists typically thought of political economy. Under
marginalism, the economic theory of value became entirely subjective,
based on the individual utility function rather than on any criterion that
could be determined from the desired good itself or the environment in
which the choice was made. As a result, marginalism forced a shift in
economics' methodology from the measure of things or the environment in
which they were contained, to the measure of human choice and
preference. To state it differently, economics' basis of measurement
58. On the influence of German historicism on Progressive Era economics,
see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42
Stan.L.Rev. 993, 996-997 (1990). See also Dorothy Ross, The Origins of
American Social Science 104-105 (1991); Mary Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity:
A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865-1905 at 50-57
(1975).
59. Lionel C. Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science 46 (1932).
60. Robbins, Essay, p. 16 (emphasis added). On the intellectual and
technical history or Robbins' definition, see Roger Backhouse and Steven G.
Medema, Defining Economics: Robbins's Essay in Theory and Practice (SSRN
Working Paper Series, March 11, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969994.
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moved from an essentially natural science model to a model based on
presumed rationality or observed individual behavior. One no longer
measured value by looking at the amount of something that was available
or the historical cost of producing it; rather one needed to measure
individual willingness to pay.
The great Cambridge marginalist Alfred Marshall knew that the
whole notion of subjective preference meant nothing at all unless it could
be measured behaviorally.
Thus one could meaningfully speak of
consumer demand only "as represented by the schedule of the prices at
which he is willing to buy different amounts of" something."61 In the highly
influential eighth edition of his Principles of Economics, Marshall wrote:
If then we wish to compare . . . physical gratifications, we must do it
not directly, but indirectly by the incentives which they afford to
action. If the desire to secure either of two pleasures will induce
people in similar circumstances each to do just an hour's extra
work, or induce men in the same rank of life and with the same
means each to pay a shilling for it; we then can say that those
pleasures are equal for our purposes, because the desires for them
are equally strong incentives to action for persons under similar
conditions.62
The other characteristic of marginalism that made it so important for
business valuation was its forward rather than backward looking
perspective. For the classicist valuation was all about averages, and
averages were always historical.
Thus the wage-fund doctrine as
previously described determined the optimal rate of wages by considering
the surplus left over from the previous production period.63 By contrast,
neoclassical theory asked "How much will one more laborer contribute to
profitability," and concluded that any wage up to that amount would offer a
positive contribution to the entrepreneur. In price theory, the classical
conception of cost meant average cost, which looked at past expenditures
divided by output. By contrast, "marginal" cost looked at the cost that a
firm's managers anticipated that the firm would incur in the production of
one additional unit. Further, marginal cost rather than average cost drives
the decision about what price to charge or how much to produce. Indeed,
perhaps the greatest single contribution of the marginalist model is that
economic decision making occurs "at the margin" -- by comparing

61. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics 158 (1890).
62. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 15-16 (8th ed 1920).
63. See discussion supra, text at notes __.
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anticipated gains against anticipated costs -- and in this calculation
previous investment is formally irrelevant.64
The principal problem faced by classical political economy had
been to explain why people and firms produce and consume mixtures of
goods, even though these goods appear to have widely different values.
The classicists were also hard put to explain value itself. Why is air cheap,
even though it is essential for survival? Why are diamonds expensive,
even though they are luxuries? A more technical problem also faced by
the classical political economists had been identifying what is a "cost," and
determining what the relationship is between the cost of something and its
value.
To illustrate some of the problems and the marginalist solution,
consider the person whose favorite experience is eating peach ice cream.
Why doesn't this person purchase and consume tons of peach ice cream
and nothing else? After all, he prefers a dollar's worth of peach ice cream
to a dollar's worth of any other product. Such questions so vexed the
classical political economists that they generally resorted to elaborate
theories of objective value, or "primary" goods; or to such metaphysical
explanations as that people have a basic nature that requires them to
consume a particular mixture of goods. But such explanation paradigms
were totally unhelpful in explaining the manifold differences one could
observe in the choices of different individuals. Classical political economy
generally settled on a rather ambiguous notion that the "value" of anything
is a function of its cost. But once again, that did not explain the fact that
different people placed widely different values on one unit of a good, even
though its cost was everywhere the same; further, pre-marginalist
economics had only the poorest conception of what a "cost" really was,
since all costs had to be stated as either totals or averages, and neither of
these seemed to be determinative of profitability or rate of output.
In the case of the peach ice cream, the marginalist answer was so
elegant and obvious that it appeared instantly to be the key to almost every
question about individual and social value. Even the person who says his
favorite experience is eating peach ice cream experiences declining
marginal utility for it. The value of each further quart of peach ice cream
declines as he has more. He will buy peach ice cream until the utility from
the next unit to be purchased has fallen to a level equal to his marginal
64. As John Maynard Keynes noted already in his student notes of 1905,
previously expended labor has no impact on value if value is a function of marginal
desire, or willingness to pay. See Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Hopes
Betrayed, 1883-1920 at 165 (1983).
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utility for some other good, such as broccoli. For example, suppose he
obtains twenty utils65 of utility from his first quart of peach ice cream.
Saying that his favorite experience is eating peach ice cream is equivalent
to saying that the value he places on this first unit of peach ice cream is
greater than the value he places on the first unit of any other good. But this
person will not likely value a second quart of peach ice cream by quite as
much as the first, and almost certainly will not value the 100th quart by as
much as the first. Suppose he obtains twenty utils from the first quart of
peach ice cream, eighteen utils from the second, sixteen from the third, and
so on in linear fashion. By contrast, he obtains five utils from his first
pound of broccoli, four from the second, and so on.
The classicists, not having the concept of marginal utility, observed
only that the subject preferred peach ice cream to broccoli and were hard
pressed to explain why he purchased any broccoli at all. But on the above
numbers the marginalist would draw remarkably precise conclusions.
Assume that peach ice cream cost $1.00 per quart, broccoli $1.00 per
pound, and the subject had ten dollars to spend. He would buy eight
quarts of ice cream and two pounds of broccoli. Once he had seven quarts
of ice cream the marginal utility for the next quart would be four utils. At
that point an additional dollar spent on a pound of broccoli would give him
five utils of utility while another quart of peach ice cream would produce
only four. A utility maximizer would buy a pound of broccoli. Then, with
two dollars left he would face three options. He could buy two additional
quarts of ice cream which would produce four utils for the first and two utils
for the second, or six. He could buy two additional pounds of broccoli,
which would give four utils and three utils, or seven. Or he could buy one
of each, which would produce four utils and four utils, or eight. He would
buy one of each, giving him a total of eight quarts of peach ice cream and
two pounds of broccoli.
Neoclassicism produced several important corollaries from the
simple statement of marginalism described above. First, when people
place value on goods that they are considering, only the marginal value,
not the total value, is relevant. Second, people tend to equate utilities over
their entire set of purchasing decisions. Presumptively, every person's
stock of goods is such that her marginal values are all precisely identical.
To the extent they are not, she corrects the situation the next time she
purchases by buying whatever has the highest marginal value.
Third, business firms, whose goal is the maximization of profits,
also equate marginal utilities, but these are measured as marginal
expenditures and marginal revenues. For example, in deciding what inputs
65. A "util" is an imaginary unit of satisfaction.
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to use in making a product, the firm maximizes its profits by using each
input up to a point that its marginal cost is identical to the marginal cost of
every other input. If labor and machinery are alternative inputs into a
product and the current cost of labor is $5 per unit of value produced while
the current cost of machinery is $4, the firm will invest in more machinery
and less labor until the two are equalized. Likewise, in deciding what
mixtures of products to produce, the firm produces each up to the point that
the marginal profit from producing more is equalized. Suppose a firm
makes widgets and gidgets. Additional gidgets can be sold at a profit of
$1.50 while additional widgets can be sold at a profit of $1.00. The firm will
make relatively more gidgets and relatively less gidgets. It will continue
making this adjustment until the marginal profitability is the same, or until
the rate of widget production falls to zero, whichever comes first.
Thus marginalism provided economics with the basis for a general
theory of consumer demand, a theory of value, a theory about production
and consumption, and a theory of costs, all of which could be quantified
with great apparent mathematical precision, although measurement
problems remained difficult.
Thanks to marginalism, neoclassical
economics became more coherent and rigorous than classicism had ever
hoped to be.
The Emergence of Neoclassical Price Theory
Neoclassical economics developed out of a marginal utility theory
that based value on forward looking subjective preference rather than
historical averages of objective investments. But in the 1920s a divergence
occurred in neoclassical economics that controls its various subdisciplines
to this day. Neoclassical price theory -- or the theory of how firms
maximize profits -- very largely did away with the study of the actual
preferences of the business firm and simply assumed that the business
firm was organized in order to maximize profits.
Even today, in
neoclassical price theory and industrial organization (the study of firms and
markets) the subjective intentions of a business firm rarely count for much
except as a device for explaining otherwise ambiguous behavior.
For example, when an economist says that in a competitive market
a firm prices at marginal cost, or that a monopolist equates marginal cost
and marginal revenue, it is not because she has conducted a survey asking
firms how they set prices or output. It is because making decisions in
these ranges can be shown to maximize profits on the basis of strictly
objective and formal criteria, such as the amount of market power that the
firm has and the nature of market demand.
In contrast, welfare economics deals largely with the preferences of
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biological individuals, who have much more complex motives than
maximization of profits or wealth. In order to study consumer behavior, for
example, one must to a considerable extent rely on revealed preference.66
In sum, welfare economics rested on "behaviorist" concepts while the
economic theory of the firm largely rested on an assumption of profitmaximization.
Because modern corporate finance is a mixture of economic theory
and economic policy it has never insisted quite so stridently that firm
behavior must be evaluated without regard to subjective intent. Further, a
great deal of improper behavior by firms may also not be profit maximizing,
in the sense that it maximizes the value of the firm as a whole. Rather, it
may simply transfer wealth from shareholders or employees to managers,
and often reduces corporate profits in the process. Nevertheless, the
neoclassical theory of corporate finance very largely treats the modern
corporation as a unitary profit-maximizing entity and assesses its behavior
on that basis. Under the formal theory the separate identity of both
shareholders and managers is irrelevant.
Marginalism and Corporate Value
In sharp contrast to classicism's focus on previously invested capital
and stated par value, neoclassicists viewed the value of a corporation as its
ability to earn profits in the future. This was in turn a function of the degree
by which anticipated revenues would exceed anticipated costs.67 Indeed,
as many neoclassicists would point out, the amount of previous investment
often had very little to do with value. Some corporations which had
invested little but found just the right niche were worth many times more
than paid in capital. Others, which had expended giant sums on research
that had gone nowhere, might be worth only a tiny fraction. To be sure, the
classicists had known these facts for almost a century, but had been
unable to develop a theory of value that would account for them.
66. On this all important distinction between the concept of value in price
theory as opposed to emergent welfare economics see University of Chicago
economist Jacob Viner's harsh critique. Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in Value
Theory and Its Critics. II. The Utility Concept in Welfare Economics, 33 J. Pol.
Econ. 638, 657 (1925), accusing welfare economists of importing the objective
concepts of price theory into their analysis in order to avoid the harder job of
empirical testing of actual human preferences. "[M]uch of what passes for utility
theory is really objective price-theory presented in the purloined terminology of
subjective analysis...." And see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of PreferenceBased Legal Policy, 89 Nw.U.L.Rev. 4, 81-82 (1994).
67. One of the better statements of this position among financial economists is
William Lough, Business Finance, Ch. 8 (1917).
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The marginalist revolution had several implications for corporate
law. First, the entire concept of "par value," with par measured as a
function of previous investment, was of little worth in measuring the value
of a corporation. If the concept of "par value" was to prove useful at all, it
must be based on the current value of the corporation's assets, with assets
generally measured by their value to the corporation itself -- that is, their
capacity to produce a profit, or their exchange value in a sale. So George
Kennan argued in 1916 that it was perfectly legitimate for the Chicago and
Alton Railroad to reorganize in 1899 and greatly increase its capitalization,
even though no additional capital had been paid in to the corporation. The
new value simply represented the railroad's increased prospects to earn a
profit.68
Opponents writing in the economics journals generally
acknowledged that in theory anticipated ability to earn a profit was a
superior measure of value than historically invested capital; they
complained merely that while invested capital was easily measurable,
determining ability to earn a profit was a purely speculative exercise.69
In 1909 a group of corporate attorneys led by Francis Lynde
Stetson convinced the New York Bar Association to back a proposal to
amend the state's corporation law to permit shares to be issued "without
the dollar mark" -- that is, without a stated par value.70 In 1912 New York
became the first state to pass a statute permitting corporations to issue
shares having no-par, or merely nominal par, value. The statute required
the company to state what its working capital was, but permitted the
company to state the value of this capital in terms of current market value,
which of course reflected the business prospects of the firm.71 During the
1910's most states passed similar statutes. By 1927 nearly forty states had
amended their corporation statutes to permit no-par shares,72 and by 1947
every state except Nebraska and Kentucky had done so.73 As the new
68. George Kennan, The Chicago & Alton Case: A Misunderstood Transaction
28-34 (1916).
69. James Bonbright, No-Par Stock: its Economics and Legal Aspect, 38
Q.J.Econ. 440 (1924); James Bonbright, Earning Power as a Basis of Corporate
Capitalization, 35 Q.J.Econ. 482 (1921).
70. William Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 46 (1927).
71. Act of April 15, 1912, ''19-23 of the Stock Corporation Law. See also
Parker, Corporation Manual '8 (1930).
72. See 5 Seymour Thompson, supra note ___ at '3627.
73. See Carlos L. Israels, Problems of Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal,
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statutes developed, they generally permitted the shareholders or directors
to declare the capital of the corporation, making changes periodically.74
The Twilight of Classical Valuation Theory
The most general and important implication of marginalism for legal
thought was its destruction of the concept that law can be either "private" or
self-executing. As originally conceived, deterrence based legal theories
may have been based on some conception of the person of average
sensibility, temperament, or carefulness. But the conception quickly gave
way to the notion that the "average" person was nothing more than the
state's reification of a standard that its decision makers wished to impose.
Ultimately, the standard was normative and objective.
Just as important, neoclassicism's forward looking standards of
value greatly contributed to the uncertainty and open-endedness of legal
policy making. Contracts were no longer thought of as bargains made in
the past, but as the creation of ongoing relationships in need of regulation.
The transition to no-par corporate shares meant that corporate
creditworthiness could no longer be viewed as the result of a precisely
measurable transaction completed in the past.
Looking forward necessarily implied greater uncertainty than
looking back, and uncertainty seemed to increase the opportunity for abuse
and error. These two factors -- that standards were publicly rather than
privately created, and that forward-looking policies needed to be managed
in ways that backward ones did not -- account for the rise of the regulatory
state during the New Deal.
Many Progressives viewed the rise of no-par stock with
considerable suspicion, generally concluding that it represented nothing
more than legislative capture by corporate entrepreneurs. Berle and
Means objected that the rise of no-par shares created yet another
opportunity for corporate managers and majority shareholders to abuse
minority shareholders. The movement toward no-par shares gave directors
the power to "dilute at will" the value of outstanding shares.75 And they had
47 Col.L.Rev. 1279 (1947).
74. As Berle and Means noted in 1932, virtually all statutes by that time
permitted the Board of Directors to declare the capital. Adolf A. Berle and
Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 159 (1932).
75. Berle and Means, supra note __ at 159. Berle had expressed similar
opinions a few years earlier. See Adolf August berle, Studies in the Law of
Corporation Finance 64 (1928) ("Probably the greatest single step in transferring
control of property rights from stockholders to corporate managements was taken
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a point. One problem with the marginalist mechanism of establishing value
was that it was so imprecise and susceptible of manipulation.
Further, this separation of "value" from paid-in capital was just more
evidence that the link between ownership and control of the corporation
was all but gone. Berle and Means wrote:
What is a share of stock "worth." . . . Curious as it may seem, the
fact appears to be that liquid property, at least under the corporate
system, obtains a set of values in exchange, represented by market
prices, which are not immediately dependent upon . . . the
underlying values of the properties themselves. Two forms of
property appear, one above the other, related but not the same. At
the bottom is the physical property itself, still immobile. . . . Related
to this is a set of tokens, passing from hand to hand. . . , which
attain an actual value in exchange or market price only in part
dependent upon the underlying property. Into it enter elements
which are not normally admitted to be elements in the value of the
latter. The tokens may, for instance, represent in their value an
appraisal of the supposed ability of the particular management
interposed between the properties and the owners.76
Thus under no-par stock the value of a corporation -- previously
accessible to anyone who knew stated par and the number of shares of
each class outstanding -- became a mystery known only to the managers.
Minority shareholders acted largely in ignorance. These observations
tended to exacerbate the view held by many marginalist liberals, such as
John Maynard Keynes, that the stock market had become little more than a
"casino" in which equity traders gambled, paying prices that had little to do
with a corporation's worth. Only after considerable marginalist theorizing
did this view give way to the modern belief that capital markets are efficient
and share prices generally reflect a company's intrinsic worth.77
In any event, the need for complete, ongoing disclosure to
prospective shareholders loomed much larger under the marginalist theory
of value, since it looked to current capacity to earn a profit rather than
historical investment. As late as the 1860's stock certificates had been
looked at as almost a firm of "currency," in which the par value stated on
when the institution of non-par-stock was adopted into American corporation law.").
76. Id. at 285-286.
77. See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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the certificate was presumptive evidence of the value of the corporation.
Indeed, even in 1924, after no-part stock had become well established,
Cornelius Wickersham complained that "gullible" purchasers continued to
believe that the stated par value on a stock certificate somehow
represented the value of the shares.78 Rather, a certificate stating "that the
holder is entitled to the share in the assets thereby represented (whatever
those assets may be) is a more accurate statement of his rights as a
stockholder of the corporation than one designating a par value."79
Thus by the time of the Blue Sky laws and a little later the federal
Securities Acts, the perceived problem was not exaggeration of paid in
capital, but rather "balance sheet inflation." Section 11 of the federal
statute created liability in the directors for knowingly making false
statements concerning the value of virtually any element of corporate
assets, and gave a lawsuit to anyone who purchased shares in reliance on
such statements.80
The great corporate scandals of the Gilded Age produced an antibusiness corporation rhetoric that remains with us today. Certainly there is
more than a kernel of truth in the corporate scandal stories, but much of the
reality is that the Progressive Era muckraking reflected a theory of
corporate finance that was in the process of collapsing as corporate
finance theory and the legal system shifted toward a more neoclassical
methodology of corporate valuation. Part of the story is also driven by the
historical happenstance that the increase in corporate value during the late
nineteenth century was unprecedented, making historical investment a
particularly bad surrogate for corporate evaluation. Quite simply, corporate
managers looking forward at earnings prospects might see a number many
times larger than historical invested capital.81
Nevertheless, the resiliency of the classical theory of corporate
valuation was very strong, and it lasted much longer than the wage fund
78. Cornelius Wickersham, The Progress of the Law on No Par Value Stock,
37 Harv. L.Rev. 464, 464 (1924). See also Cornelius W. Wickersham, A Treatise
on Stock Without Par Value of Ordinary Business Corporations (1927).
79. Ibid.
80. See In re Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S.E.C. 37 (1934); In re Thomas
Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939).
81. On Corporate growth during the period see Sean Dennis Cashman,
America in the Gilded Age 1-40 (3d ed. 1993). See generally Alfred D. Chandler,
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977) (rise of
large vertically integrated corporation during this period).
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doctrine.82 Even Progressive liberal economists who found the marginalist
revolution quite useful in other area were skeptical about no-par stock. A
good example is Progressive railroad economist William Z. Ripley of
Harvard's economics department. Although Ripley was too much a
marginalist to believe that "value" ought to be based on historically invested
capital rather than anticipated profitability, he nonetheless believed that the
no-par share statutes would prove to be the breeding ground of "fraud and
deception."83 This theme would be repeated among Progressives, whether
marginalist or not: whatever one might think of the process of removing par
value as a basis for corporate valuation, doing so entailed considerably
more managerial speculation, making some form of regulation in order.
Nineteenth century courts rejected out of hand the marginalist
argument that the true value of a corporation was its earnings potential.
Under this rejected argument a stock should not be considered "watered"
merely because the stated par value was less than the amount paid in.
Rather, the relevant number should be the present value of future earnings.
As the Supreme Court concluded in 1891, in determining whether sufficient
capital had been paid in, it would not look at intangibles reflecting on the
earning power of the corporation, for these were "too unsubstantial and
shadowy" to provide an estimate of value. The Court conceded "that the
goodwill of a business may be the subject of barter and sale as between
the parties to it. . . ." But in cases involving corporate default and a creditor
allegation of watered stock, they provided no basis for determining value.84
A 1905 New Jersey court -- one of the courts that was most solicitous of
corporate managers -- concluded that corporate promoters were not
entitled to declare the value of paid in property by estimating future
corporate profits. . . .85 The court rejected the view that it was "competent
and lawful to make up the valuation of the visible property to be purchased
for stock issued, by adding . . . a sum of money ascertained by the
capitalization of the annual profits expected to be realized from a favorable

82. See discussion supra, text at notes __.
83. W. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 49 (1927).
84. Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104, 115 (1892).
85. See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J.Eq. 36, 61 A. 843 (1905) (rejecting
evaluation that depended in part on anticipated suppression of the firm's
competitors and anticipated price increase of the product from $20 to $28 per ton;
court states that paid-in property used for evaluation must be something "visible
and tangible." 69 N.J. Eq. at 53, 61 A. at 850.
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marketing of the product."86 Most nineteenth century courts enforced this
rule simply by asking juries whether the money and property paid into the
corporation had a value at the time it was paid in that equaled or exceeded
the stated par value of the shares. This rule, generally known as the "true
value" rule, ignored estimates of value made by the incorporators
themselves, even if these had been made in good faith.87 The "only
question for the jury is, was the property worth the amount of the stock."88
But even as these courts were stating the orthodox view, others
were developing rationalizations that changed corporate valuation from a
classical to a neoclassical exercise. Already in 1886 the Supreme Court
had adopted a standard for the federal courts which deferred to the
incorporators' good faith estimates of the value of their corporation.89 If the
estimate was made in good faith, then the corporation would not
subsequently be found undercapitalized simply because the value of paid
in property turned out to be inadequate to cover the corporation's debts.
This good faith test became relevant when paid in capital included real or
personal property instead of or in addition to cash. The inevitable
consequence of the good faith rule was that the value of the capital "paid
in" began to reflect estimates of anticipated profitability, for such estimates
guided even "good faith" judgments about the value of non-cash property.
In approving of the no-par statutes, Victor Morawetz, one of the
most distinguished corporation scholars in the United States,
acknowledged that a business corporation must have a capital that cannot
be impaired by the declaration of stock dividends. However, "it is not
necessary that the amount of capital should be fixed by reference to the
nominal or par amount of the shares issued by the corporation, and it is not
necessary that the shares should purport to represent specified sums of
money contributed to the capital."90 Then Morawetz noted the emergent
view that in most cases the amount of capital paid in bore little relationship
to the value or creditworthiness of the corporation:91
86. Id. at 848.
87. See Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1898); and see
Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Jamison, 256 F. 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1919), which
discussed the rule and ultimately rejected it.
88. Clinton, 256 F. at 579.
89. Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 347 (1886).
90. Victor Morawetz, Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, 26 Harv.L.Rev.
729 (1913).
91. One exception was banks and similar corporations "whose business is to
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In most cases, the capital, or a large part of the capital, or a
corporation is invested permanently in fixed plant or machinery
which cannot again be converted into cash, and whose value, in
great measure depends upon the profitableness of the company's
business."92

A potential creditor or purchaser of shares was probably less
interested in the amount of capital that had been paid into the business
than in the business' potential to earn a profit. By the late 1910s a few
courts began to hold that the proper measure of the value of property was
the going concern value of the property to the corporation rather than its
historical value.93 As a consequence, the "trust fund" doctrine gradually
disappeared.94 James Bonbright, one of the 1930's best known scholars of
corporate finance, concluded that the emerging definition of corporate
value was far more realistic than the classical definition because, as far as
creditors are concerned, the relevant values are "going concern" values.
Normally, "the amount of `invested capital' in which he is supposedly
interested is the amount of profit-making power which the assets may
confer upon the company."95
In his influential treatise on corporate finance, Arthur Stone Dewing
distinguished between economic, accounting and legal conceptions of
corporate capital.
Importantly, both the legal conception and the
accounting conception relied heavily on the stated values of amounts that
had previously been paid in. By contrast, businessmen and investors were
interested mainly in the economic meaning of capital, which had to do with
productive value. A corporation might have a patent for which it paid little
deal in money, credits, and securities, and whose assets are kept in liquid form."
Id. at 729.
92. Ibid.
93. For example, Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Jamison, 256 F. 577, 582
(3d Cir. 1919), which permitted valuation to be based even on the probability that a
mining corporation would discover additional ore not yet discovered on the date of
the claim.
94. See 5 S & T. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Corporations
'3425 at 260 (3d ed. 1927), who concluded that the trust fund doctrine was "not
only monstrous but in practicable application would be ruinous to the business
management of corporations."
95. 2 Bonbright, supra note __ at 801.
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or nothing, noted Dewing, but was nevertheless of great value.96 Rather
than looking at a corporation's creditworthiness, or "capital," as that which
had been paid in, it should be viewed as representing "anything of concrete
and specific value, material or intangible, which affords definite help in
enabling the corporation to conduct its business at a profit."97 Dewing went
on to note that, although this conception of capital was the important one, it
was easily subject to abuse because the corporation could more easily
exaggerate its earnings potential than it could the cash value of specific
cash or property that had been paid in in the past.
In defending the rise of no-par shares, Dewing noted simply that
"the right to participate in earning is the fundamental characteristic of stock
-- not its right to participate in the property. . . ." As a result, no-par shares
were designed to "record the proportional rights of their holders in the
earnings of the corporation and ignore the amount of the contribution on
which their rights were based."98
Under the classical theory, par value was "the actual and
substantial stake contributed by the owners of the business, and on the
strength of this stake they are justified in asking for and receiving credit."99
But the problem with this theory was that paid in capital had absolutely
nothing to do with the value or creditworthiness of the corporation as a
going concern.
[A]s soon as the new corporation begins business operations,
whatever correspondence between the value of its property and the
nominal or money value of its capital stock that may have existed in
the beginning, is lost immediately. Some of these operations result
in a profit, in which case the corporate property is increased while
the amount of outstanding capital stock remains the same; some
operations result in a loss, and a discrepancy between the property
and the par value of the capital stock arises in the opposite
direction. The important thing to observe is that the equality
between property and capital stock, however justified at the
beginning, is upset by the very operations for which the corporation
was organized."100
96. 1 A.S. dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 55 (4th ed. 1941) (first
edition, 1919).
97. Id. at 56.
98. Id. at 68.
99. Dewing, supra note __ at 71.
100. Id. at 73-74.
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Dewing was more sanguine than Progressive economists about the
potential for abuse. In his view no-par shares would serve to increase the
participation of investors in corporate affairs. Having removed previously
invested capital as a basis for estimating value, the prospective
shareholder or lender would be
forced to investigate the earnings of the corporation, present and
past, the history of the corporation and its managers, its standing in
the industry, and the value of its shares with reference to current
and future interest rates, as they are affected by the rise and fall of
industrial activity. These factors and others like them determine
values, and anything that forces the investor to seek for them tends
to conserve the social capital by encouraging greater intelligence
and acumen among investors."101
How liability should be assessed when corporations with no-par
stock were found to be undercapitalized was initially a difficult problem for
the courts, and they faced the new method of valuation with considerable
confusion. In Norton v. Lamb (1936) the Kansas Supreme Court simply
held that subscribers who had not actually paid even the $1 nominal par
value stated on the share certificates could be held liable for that sum.102
Other decisions served to realize the worst fears of the Progressive
critics. Courts held that no-par shares effectively meant that creditors were
without a remedy provided that the nominal par, if stated, had been paid
and the corporation met any minimum capitalization requirement assessed
by state law. For example, in G. Loewus & Co. v. Highland Queen Packing
Co. (1939), the incorporators had transferred property worth $1500 to the
corporation but carried this on their books as capital worth $6000. Under
New Jersey law the requirements for issuance of no-par shares had been
met and the statute held that such shares "shall be deemed fully paid and
non-assessable, and the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the
corporation or its creditors in respect thereof."103 This denied the creditors
any remedy. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held that the regime created by no-

101. Dewing, supra note __ at 75. Compare R. H. Hollen & R.S. Tuthill, Uses
of Stock Having no Par Value, 7 A.B.A.J. 579 (1921) (no par stock forces the
investor to look at the corporation's current value before making an investment
decision, rather than focusing on that which was historically paid in.).
102. Norton v. Lamb, 144 Kan. 665, 62 P.2d 1311 (1936).
103. N.J. Rev. Stat. '14:8-6 (1937).
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par statutes was essentially "let the creditor beware. . . ."104
As Dodd and Baker had pointed out in their widely used casebook
on corporate law, the issuance of no-par shares did not absolve the
corporation of an obligation to state its value to potential creditors. Rather,
it shifted the focus away from the historical value of capital at the time the
shares had been issued to the current value that the corporation stated in
its accounting books. Speaking of the problem of "watering" of no-par
shares, they said:
Even where the transaction or acquisition is one of mere barter of
no-par shares for property or services, a valuation of the latter is a
practical necessity from the mere fact that corporations are
expressly or impliedly required to keep books of account, and as yet
there is no known way of keeping books in other than monetary
terms. So if Blackacre is acquired through the issue of no-par
shares, it is necessary to apply to Blackacre some figure in dollars
at which to enter it on the books as a debit to an asset account. . .
.105
In 1947 Carlos Israels noted that a corporation could avoid all stock
watering liability by simply stating its capital conservatively -- no greater
than a price at which contributed property could readily be sold -- and then
add any additional evaluation as paid in surplus. Such a company was not
undercapitalized, and creditors could make anything they wished of the
paid-in surplus figure. In all events, the value of the shares was driven not
by the amount that had been paid in:
The investing public has been "educated" to the point where it is
now quite willing to pay much more than par for a par value share,
and where it is very little concerned with book value, or with the
proportion of the price of no-par shares proposed to be credited to
capital. Earnings or earnings possibilities appears to dominate
investor thinking as to price.106
By 1940 economists were taking a much more explicitly marginalist
look at the problem. For example, in the second edition of their book on
public control of corporations, Charles Tippets and Shaw Livermore noted

104. Johnson v. Louisville Trust, 293 F. 857 (C.C.A.6th 1923).
105. E. Merrick Dodd & Ralph J. Baker, Cases and Materials on Business
Associations 1004 (1940).
106. Israels, supra note __, 47 Col. L.Rev. at 1292-1293.
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that the problem of watered stock had been attended by "much loose
thinking and writing." First of all, true value was virtually impossible to
determine, and there were several methods of going about it:
If physical appraisal by engineers is meant, then earning rates
could be matched against a definite figure and a proper amount of
securities obtained
But even slight acquaintance with the
conditions of competitive industry teaches that there is no typical
relationship between value of physical assets and earning power. It
may be very different for a chewing gum concern and a steel
plant.107
Tippetts and Livermore identified stock as watered simply when its
declared value "was larger than a reasonable capitalization rate applied to
the earnings" would warrant.
The Neoclassical Corporation:
From Institutionalism to the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Marginalism's Critics: Darwinism and Institutionalism
Marginalism was only one of the two great scientific revolutions of
the Victorian Era. During this period American scientific and moral values
were overrun at least as much by Darwinism, also of essentially British
origin.108 These two theories of human behavior were hardly consistent
with each other. Nevertheless they worked together in an odd way to make
behaviorism the key to understanding nearly everything important about
the human condition.
American intellectual historians in the fifties and sixties wrote the
history of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era as if it were entirely a story
about the various intellectual offshoots of Darwinism.109 Indeed, it is still

107. Charles S. Tippetts & Shaw Livermore, Business Organizations and
Public Control 378 (2d ed. 1941).
108. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by means of natural Selection,
or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859). On Darwin's
influence on late Victorian American intellectuals see Louis Menand, The
Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (2001).
109. For example, Robert G. McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age
of Enterprise, 1865-1910 at 26-30 (1951); Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in
American Thought 60-63 and passim (rev. ed. 1959); Sydney Fine, Laissez Faire
and the General Welfare State 84-85 (1964). Henry S. Commager, The American
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fashionable to use Social Darwinism as the paradigm for explaining liberty
of contract, or the general laissez faire position of the Supreme Court after
the turn of the century.110
Nonetheless, one viewing mainstream legal writing during this
period is struck by the absence of reference to Darwin or to Social
Darwinist rhetoric.111 Historians have been quite willing to assign a cause
for the legal revolution of the turn of the century that has only the thinnest
support in the writings of the legal scholars themselves. For example,
Holmes' professional career stretched over more than sixty years, but his
writing includes a scant half dozen references to Darwin, and even these
are sufficiently ambiguous that scholars still debate about whether Holmes
was in fact a Social Darwinist.112 In his well-known Lochner dissent he
accused the Supreme Court's majority of using the Fourteenth Amendment
to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"113 but with no evidence that
any member of the Court had ever given either Darwin or Spencer a single
thought.
Mind 359-373 (1950). See also Edward S. Corwin, Court Over Constitution (2d ed.
1950); Bernard Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in
Retrospect (1957).
110. For example, Paul Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics: the
Anatomy of Lochner v. New York 67-68 (1990). Contrast Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 Stan.L.Rev. 379 (1988).
For another effort to minimize the role of Social Darwinism, see Michael J. Phillips,
The Lochner Court, Myth and Reality: Substantive Due Process from the 1890s to
the 1930s (2000).
111. For example, see A. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law:
Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887-1895 at 22 & n. 10 ([1960] rep. ed. 1976), who,
while attributing the rise of laissez faire conservatism among lawyers to Social
Darwinism, concedes that although he read hundreds of lawyers' speeches, nearly
none of them contained references to Herbert Spencer, the great popularizer of
Social Darwinism.
112. On the theory of evolution and Holmes, see Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 449 (1889); Holmes, Primitive Notions in
Modern Law, 10 Am. L. Rev. 422, 429-30 (1876). On Holmes's Darwinism, see
Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work and Legacy of Justice
Holmes (2000); J.W. Burrow, Holmes in His Intellectual Milieu, 17, 25, in The
Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Robert W. Gordon, ed. 1992); Jan Vetter,
The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 343 (1984); E.
Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 113 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in
Jurisprudence, 64 Tex.L.Rev. 645 (1985).
113. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
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The Darwinian approach did show up in Progressive Era economic
theory, but it was in leftward leaning institutionalism rather than
marginalism.114 The evolutionary approach to economics reflected in
institutionalism largely eschewed mathematical theory in favor of detailed
description and historical development. In economics these concerns
eventually became central to the work of such institutionalists as Thorstein
Veblen, John R. Commons, and Wesley Mitchell, all of whom yearned for a
more evolutionary approach to economics. They spent much of their lives
accounting for the ways in which economic actors departed from presumed
rational behavior.115
Marginalists at the turn of the century, when basic models for the
social sciences were being formed, faced the criticism that marginalism
was based on a narrow view of humanity that did not take biological
evolution into account. Thorstein Veblen criticized marginalist economics
for not being an "evolutionary" science.116 Marginalist economics stripped
humanity down to a set of utility functions that equated human behavior
with desire and completely ignored inherited characteristics. To be sure,
the theory of evolution was just as reductionist, recasting desire as nothing
more than the instinct to survive. But the two models developed
fundamentally different, even mutually exclusive, mechanisms for
determining appropriate social policy. The differences showed up most
starkly in theories about controlling deviant behavior and criminality.
Marginalists would control crime by creating liberty or financial incentives
that regulated the behavior of human beings as autonomous actors. By
contrast, the Darwinians would control criminal behavior by identifying
those "types" that were thought to be prone to it, and then using
sterilization or other means to ensure that they could not reproduce their
kind. What is often unappreciated today is the extent to which both models

114. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Evolution of Institutional Economics:
Agency, Structure, and Darwinism in American Institutionalism (2004). The classic
study of the difference between institutional and neoclassical economics is David
Hamilton, Evolutionary Economics: A Study of Change in Economic Thought
(1953).
115. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics
Movement, 42 Stan.L.Rev. 993 (1990).
116. Veblen, Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science, 12 Q.J.Econ.
384 (1898). Legal Realist Walton Hamilton echoed the criticisms a generation
later. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Institutionalist Approach to Economic Theory,
9 Am.Econ.Rev. 309 (1919).
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guided Progressive Era policy making.117
One important difference between marginalist and Darwinian
models was the degree of empirical content. Darwinian investigations were
heavily empirical and during the post-Civil War and Progressive Era
produced detailed empirical studies into subjects such as the source of
criminality, degeneration, social control, and the like.118 In economics,
institutionalism tended to yield detailed historical studies of particular
industries or firms. By contrast, marginalism as a concept was heavily
driven by mathematics and had no empirical content at all. Marginalism
accounted for the behavior of a theoretical "rational" actor or profitmaximizing firm. Any questions about the extent to which people or firms
fail to act rationally were relegated to the fringes of economic science.
Berle and Means' Modern Corporation and Private Property119
reflected this evolutionary approach, with its focus on empirical detail and
its emphasis on the extent to which corporations departed from the norms
of rational behavior -- such as the famous discussions about inefficiencies
that result from the separation of ownership and control. As other
institutionalist writings, Berle and Means was heavily historical and drawn
to classical rather than neoclassical theories of value.120
The contrast could not be bolder. For Berle and Means the
corporation was a potentially harmful institution, often acting contrary to the
public interest but -- even more ominously -- often acting contrary to its own
best interests because management did not have the owners' interests at
heart. In contrast, the marginalist corporation was a unified economic actor
whose every action was understood in terms of profit maximization.
117. See, e.g., Mark Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American
Thought (1963, repr. New Brunswick, 1984); Donald Pickens, Eugenics and the
Progressives (Nashville, 1966).
118. See, e.g., Richard Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism,
Disease and Heredity (3d ed. 1877). And See Michael Willrich, The Two Percent
Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 19001930, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 63 (1998); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in
Jurisprudence, 64 Tex.L.Rev. 645 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility in Progressive America, 57 N.Dak.L.Rev. 541 (1981).
119. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (1932). On the writing of The Modern Corporation, see Thomas
K. McCraw,In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 Reviews in Am.Hist. 578 (1990).
120. On institutionalism as an economics movement in the United States, see
Hovenkamp, First Great Law and Economics Movement, note __, at 1013-1030.
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Indeed, marginalists tended to cast aside as irrelevant evidence that
corporations did in fact act in ways that seemed contrary to their own best
interests.
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control
Berle and Means' Modern Corporation remains to this day a
critically important historical artifact in the law of corporations. It is widely
cited, although perhaps negatively as often as positively. Undoubtedly preWar Institutionalism's most enduring legacy has been Berle and Means,
and the "separation of ownership and control" will forever be associated
with their names, even though the idea originated in Thorstein Veblen's
Absentee Ownership a decade earlier.121
In contrast, the more general pre-war institutionalist movement has
died out and largely been forgotten. Mainly, the institutionalists were
excessively empirical, much too concerned with factual detail, and unable
to devise useful theory with predictive power. The institutionalists certainly
had a point when they insisted that economics cannot be separated from
social science, history and even evolutionary biology. But in the process of
attempting to incorporate everything they gave up too much of the
elegance that neoclassicism's rational expectations models produced.122

121. Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in
Recent Times: the Case of America (1923). On the book's unfortunate history see
Rosalind Schulman, Absentee Ownership Reread, 21 Am.J. Economics &
Sociology 319 (1962) (reviewing Wesley Mitchell's "Lectures Notes on History of
Economic Thought, 1934-1935").
122. Institutionalism's modern stepchild is the much more technical New
Institutional Economics (NIE), which combines neoclassical methodologies,
including its mathematics, with an increased appreciation of institutions and a
positive research agenda. See Oliver E. Williamson, The new Institutional
Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J.Econ.Lit. 595 (2000). See also
Kenneth J. Arrow, "Reflections on the Essays," in Arrow and the Foundations of
the Theory of Economic Policy 727-734 (1987) (contrasting the old and new
institutional economics and giving a similar explanation about why the old
institutionalism failed).
For overviews see Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Claude
Menard and Mary M. Shirley, eds., 2005); Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter,
Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional
Economics (1997); Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions
(1990).
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But in fact the separation of ownership and control is not a
distinctively institutionalist notion. It was embraced equally by marginalist
neoclassicists. The important difference was attitude. For Berle and
Means as well as Veblen, the separation of ownership and control was a
serious economic and social problem, explaining why corporations did not
act in either the interests of their shareholders or the public interest. In
sharp contrast, neoclassicists embraced the separation of ownership and
control as a fundamental principle of efficient firm behavior. Indeed, in the
neoclassical model separation of ownership in control has become a virtual
prerequisite to productive management and risk taking.123
The intellectual vehicle for neoclassicism's embrace of the
separation of ownership and control was price theory. After an early period
in which welfare economics and price theory were regarded as concerned
with a common set of questions about efficiency and wealth distribution,
the "ordinalist" revolution separated them.124 Welfare economics became
concerned with individual utility preferences under the constraint that
utilities could not be quantified in a cardinal matter and interpersonally
compared. By contrast, price theory was concerned entirely with the
maximization of wealth measured in a constant monetary unit such as
dollars. Critically, neoclassical price theory gives no regard to the
observation that individual utility preferences might differ from wealth
preferences, and for measuring market behavior this has proven to be a
very powerful assumption. Under marginalism, and in contrast to the work
of Veblen or Berle & Means, neoclassical corporate finance theory
unambiguously became a part of price theory, not a part of welfare
economics. Once made, that decision guaranteed that the idiosyncratic
preferences of shareholders would be irrelevant within the neoclassical
model.
An essential tenet of neoclassical theory was that a business firm,
as any economic actor, maximizes profits, or value. Further, value
maximization is indifferent to the identity and distribution of either
shareholder or manager identity. The entire thrust of neoclassical corporate
finance theory was to turn the shareholder into nothing more than an
investor, who was presumed to have no interest other than the
maximization of value, no matter what his or her actual interest might be.

123. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.& Econ. 301 (1983); Mark J. Roe, Strong
Managers, Weak Owners: the Political Roots of American Corporate Finance
(1994).
124. Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong about
Welfare Economics?, 22 J.Econ.Lit. 507 (1984).
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The manager became nothing more than the agent of profit-maximizing
decision making. Until the rise of agency cost models, which did not occur
until after 1960, neoclassicism largely assumed the ownership/control
problem away by positing that both the firm and its shareholders had only
profit-maximization in mind.125
The neoclassical model simply assumed profit-maximization, quite
apart from the wishes of managers, shareholders, creditors or anyone else
that might be associated with a corporation. Already in the first decade of
the twentieth century the brilliant Yale neoclassicist Irving Fisher worked
out the beginning details of what was to become his "separation
theorem."126 Fisher assumed that shareholders have utility preferences
that are not capable of being specified. He then showed that in an efficient
market for capital a business firm will choose value maximization as a
strategy regardless of shareholders' utility preferences for dividends or
reinvestment or their preferences as to how profits should be spent.127 The
basic logic of the theorem is that the goal of the firm is always to maximize
the size of overall returns, which thus gives the shareholders in the
aggregate the maximum opportunity to spend the profits as they please.128
125. See harold Demsetz, The Structure of ownership and the Theory of the
Firm, 26 J.L.& Econ. 387 (1983). See also George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland,
The Literature of Economics: the Case of Berle and means, 26 J.L. & Econ. 241
(1983).
126. Fisher worked the fundamental theory out in Irving Fisher, The Nature of
Capital and Income (1906) and The Rate of Interest (1907), but he presented the
mature theorem in Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by the
Impatience to Spend income and Opportunity to Invest it (1930).
127. One statement of the theorem is:
Given perfect and complete capital markets, the production decision is
governed solely by the profit-maximization objective, and the decision is
separated from the consumption decision that is governed solely by utilitymaximization.
For a moderately technical explanation of the theorem see "Irving Fisher's
Theory of Investment," available at
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/capital/fisherinvest.htm. See also Richard
A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance
(8th ed. 2006).
128. See Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and
Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Law and Finance Approach, 2 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 1,
35-36 (2007).
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Today, Fisher's separation theorem is regarded as a building block for the
more general Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem of corporate finance,
developed in the 1950s, which states that in an efficient market for capital a
firm's value is not a function of the way it is financed -- i.e, its ratio of debt
to equity. In this model the number, identity, or interests of shareholders
became entirely irrelevant when the conditions of the theorem were
satisfied.129
Neoclassical theory also recognized that firms might make
inefficient choices, but it came to do so in the guise of "agency" costs.
While a transaction cost is a cost of using a market, or producing an
exchange between two independent actors, an agency cost is a cost of
making a decision within the firm.130 For example, while neoclassicism saw
nothing inherently inefficient in the separation of ownership and control, to
the extent such separation did lead to inefficiencies they would be
characterized as agency costs. One value of the great theorems of
corporate finance, such as Fisher's separation theorem or the ModiglianiMiller theorem is that they worked in a market where agency costs were
129. Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am.Econ.Rev. 261 (1958). See Franco
Modigliani, 3 The Collected Papers of Franco Modigliani xiii (1980, A. Abel ed.):
with well-functioning markets (and neutral taxes) and rational investors,
who can `undo' the corporate financial structure by holding positive or
negative amounts of debt, the market value of the firm - debt plus equity depends only on the income stream generated by its assets. It follows, in
particular, that the value of the firm should not be affected by the share of
debt in its financial structure or by what will be done with the returns - paid
out as dividends or reinvested (profitably).
Relatedly, see Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and Control and
the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 375 (1983) (corporate performance does
not depend on identity or configuration of shareholders); Harold Demsetz and
Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J.Corp.Fin.
209 (2001) (shareholders will eventually adopt the ownership for that maximizes
returns).
130. The classic treatment is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). See also Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders
and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv.
L. Rev. 1641, 1651 (2006); Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972).
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.Econ.Rev. 777
(1972). For an excellent brief explication of the relationship between transaction
costs in markets (separate economic actors) and agency costs within the firm, see
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 408, 416-418 (6th ed. 2003).
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zero. As a result, observers could identify problems with possible legal
solutions by inquiring into situations were these costs were positive.131 As
a result, agency costs performed the same role within the firm that
transaction costs performed in the market -- by determining where legal
policy could make a difference and then assigning legal entitlements in
such a way so as to ensure weatlh maximizing outcomes.132
Competition and Equity Markets: the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
The earliest neoclassical theorems in corporate finance, such as
Irving Fisher's separation theorem, assumed that capital markets were
efficient. In fact, the roots of the modern Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis were developed in neoclassical marginalism early on. As
William Stanley Jevons observed already in the 1870s,133 people tend to
equate their utilities: they purchase a good until the marginal utility of that
good declines to the level they experience for some other good. The
corollary in finance is that people equate their returns. Stocks became
investment vehicles whose prices were calculated to produce the same
level of return, once adjusted for risk.134
One very important difference between classical and neoclassical
value theory lay in the treatment of risk and uncertainty. Because
classicism measured value by looking at past averages, the theory did not
explicitly incorporate the risk of uncertain future events. Things such as the
value of labor or of a business firm were measured by reference to
previous investment, and risk of future events did not formally fit into the
theory. To be sure, business persons investing in the nineteenth century
certainly took anticipated risks into account, but the classical value model
did not account for them.
In very sharp contrast, marginalism's criteria of willingness-to-pay,

131. See Douglass C. North, Comment on Stigler and Friedland, 26 J.L.&
Econ. 269 (1983) (arguing that Berle and Means were in fact the first to address
the problem of agency costs within the corporation, and did so long before anyone
else did so; noting that Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386
(1937), was published five years later).
132. The Coase Theorem operates to like effect in markets. See Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.& Econ. 1 (1960).
133. See discussion supra, text at notes __.
134. See, e.g., Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 64-66 (1921).
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or expected value, almost always involved a certain amount of uncertainty.
For longer run investments or less stable markets the uncertainty could be
considerable. Figuring out how to accommodate uncertainty about the
future into economic modeling proved to a central problem of neoclassical
economics in the first half of the twentieth century.
Before modern corporate finance theory could emerge several
things had to be worked out. First, marginalism had to develop a robust
theory of competition. Because of its forward looking nature that was a
theory in which information, risk, and uncertainty acquired heightened
importance. Second, this theory had to be applied to the corporate equity
market. Finally, this theory, coupled with a set of empirical studies of
commodity and stock market behavior, led to the formulation of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis.
The initial impact of marginalist economics was a great deal of
doubt about the competitiveness and even the robustness of markets, and
many of the earliest marginalists abandoned the commitment to free
markets that was explicit in classical political economy. Some even toyed
with socialism as an alternative to free markets.135
Prominent
neoclassicists backtracked considerably from the classical hostility toward
economic regulation.136 Major technical controversies within neoclassical
economics served to create significant doubts about the efficiency of
markets.137
Gradually neoclassicism was able to work out the details of a moreor-less robust model of competition, although the domain of so-called
"perfect competition" within marginalism was never as broad as the
classicists faith that strenuous competition prevailed in virtually every
market. The neoclassicists had to deal with numerous complexities that
the marginalist model contemplated, such as increasing returns to scale,
135. See John W. Mason, Political Economy and the Response to Socialism
in Britain, 1870-1914, 23 Historical J. 565 (1980).
136. See William S. Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour 1-21 (1882). See
also Henry Sidgwick, The Principles of Political Economy 518-544 (1887)
(prominent marginalist criticizing laissez faire position of the classicists). On the
attitudes of early marginalists toward wealth distribution see Robert Cooter and
Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?, 22
J.Econ.Lit. 507 (1984).
137. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, at
chs. 22-25 (1991); and see,e.g., Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect
Competition (1933); Edward Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition
(1933).
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which gave larger firms a cost advantage over smaller ones,138 and product
differentiation, which generally made marginal cost pricing unworkable.139
In addition, marginalist corporate finance theory had to work out some
important problems regarding the relationship between a business firm's
market incentives, its selection of sources of capital, and the possibly quite
separate incentives of its stockholders. The Fisher separation theorem
discussed above was an important first step.
As the modern neoclassical model of perfect competition developed
through the first half of the twentieth century the role of information became
increasingly important. Perfect competition depended on markets with a
fairly large number of buyers and sellers, lack of significant scale
economies, and the free flow of information. University of Chicago
economist Frank Knight stressed it in his important 1921 book Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit, which identified the costless flow of information as a
precondition to effective competition.140 In addition, Knight introduced the
concepts of risk and certainty as inherent in marginalism's emphasis on
reasonable expectations. For Knight "risk" referred to variations in the
future whose probability was knowable. With good foreknowledge of
probabilities risks could be traded under competitive conditions. For
example, a precisely one in ten chance of making a $1000 oil discover is
worth $100. In contrast, "uncertainty" referred to future events whose
probability could not be known. In such cases investors would demand a
premium as compensation for exposure to an adverse outcome whose
chance of occurrence was unknowable.
Many of the early marginalists viewed the stock market with
suspicion, regarding it as not conforming to the usual laws of supply and
demand.
Certainly the boom-bust stock price cycles of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century served to frustrate application of
basic competition theory to stock pricing. Prices appeared to gyrate wildly,
with no apparent relation to the value of the underlying firm.141 Under this

138. See Henry Carter Adams, "Relation of the State to Industrial Action," 1
Pub., Am. Econ. Assn. 7, 52, 59-64 (1887) (arguing that industries subject to
significant scale economies must be regulated by the government). See also
Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at Ch. 23.
139. See Chamberlin, note __.
140. Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 78-87 (1921).
141. See, e.g., John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, Ch. 12 (1936) (arguing that stock market operates as a kind of
"beauty contest" in which shares prices were based not on fundamental value but
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line of thinking technical analysis flourished, with stock traders hoping to
pick winners by trying to find predictable similarities in past pricing
behavior.142
But a more theoretical purist strand in neoclassical economics
developed the view that, notwithstanding the frenzy with which stocks are
often purchased and sold, overall pricing tends to reflect fundamental
values.
For example, Yale economist Irving Fisher, author of the
separation theorem, consistently argued that stock prices reflected intrinsic
values in which returns to stocks operated as an "implied" rate of interest in
which owners were compensated with higher returns in exchange for taking
on greater risk.143 John Burr Williams also insisted that the price of shares
reflected the intrinsic value that they represented -- namely, objectively
reasonable expectations of future earnings and dividends. Mathematically,
the value of a corporation is the expected value of its stream of future
earnings.144 Building on Williams' work, University of California economist
Harry Markowitz then developed the idea that the development of an
optimal portfolio of stocks consists in selecting stocks of differing risk
levels, and that riskier investments were offset by higher rates of return,
although greater variability as well.145
The efficient capital market hypothesis was very much constructed
rather one each buyer's prediction of what valuation others would place on a firm's
shares). See also John Hicks, Value and Capital: An Inquiry into some
Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory (1939); Robert Rhea, The Dow
Theory (1932).
142. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance
Triumphed over Industry 274 (San Francisco: BK Pub., 2007).
143. Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest 10 (1907) (speaking of an "implied rate
of interest" in stocks that reflect the investor's anticipation of returns; see also id. at
216, on the differential returns of stocks and bonds, noting that the intrinsic value
of stocks is such as to produce a higher rate or return because they are also
accompanied by more risk). More than two decades later Fisher returned to the
same themes. Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by the
Impatience to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest It (1930).
See also Benjamin Graham and D.L. Dodd, Security Analysis: Principles
and Technique (1951) (emphasizing a strategy of "value investing" by studying
fundamentals in search of undervalued stocks).
144. John Burr Williams, Theory of Investment Value (1938).
145. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.Finance 77 (1952).
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on the marginalist theory of perfect competition, in which every market
participant is a price taker and the price of a stock quickly moves toward an
equilibrium that tends to equalize its risk adjusted return to that of other
stocks and financial instruments.146 The thinking developed in stages, from
the observation that returns at the margin will be equalized; to the
observation that to the extent the market discounts all information about a
stock into the price the current price is always the "correct" one; to the
observation that even high risk and low risk stocks should produce the
same return in the long run because high risk will be compensated through
a stock price that yields a higher return.147 As a result, any randomly
selected mixture of stocks should perform just as well as any other similarly
diversified mixture.
From that point the only missing ingredient was informational
efficiency -- or the idea that the market price of a security is a reflection of
the information that is publicly known about it. To the extent that
information is both accurate and relatively quickly disseminated this price
will tend to reflect rational expectations about fundamental value.148
Already in 1900 Louis Bachelier, a French mathematician, had written a
doctoral dissertation entitled The Theory of Speculation, arguing that the
history of commodity prices shows that they are in fact randomly
distributed, making it impossible to predict future prices from past price

146. See Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric S. Maskin, The Efficient Market
Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market, 98 J.Pol.Econ. 70 (1990),
who notes that the ECMH assumes nearly perfect competition and breaks down
under oligopoly, where prices and the release of information may be strategic. If
transaction costs are positive or there are serious asymmetries in information then
various versions of the hypothesis may not apply.
147. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.Fin. 77 (1952).
148. Eugene F. Fama's doctoral dissertation, often credited with assembling
the data and proofs that created the modern efficient market hypothesis, was
published as Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J.Bus. 34
(1965). See also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J.Finance 383 (1970) (initially proposing the "strong,"
"semi-strong" and "weak" forms of the efficient market hypothesis. See also
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, J. Finance 1575 (1991); Eugene F.
Fama, Foundations of Finance (1976). See also Sanford Grossman, The
Informational Role of Prices (1989).
On the history of the efficient market hypothesis, see Michael C. Jensen
and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance 2-20 (1984).
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histories.149 Beginning in the 1930s a number of studies suggested the
same thing for stock prices.150 For example, detailed recording of a series
of throws of a single die provides information that there is a one in six
chance of getting a five, but no sequence in historical throws provides any
useful information about predicting a sequence in future throws. As a
result an efficient investor might as well forget the research and purchase
shares without even a minimal knowledge of a firm's business or its
prospects.
In his now famous doctoral dissertation Eugene Fama assembled
this theory about competition, information dispersion as well as the
empirical studies of pricing behavior into what has become known as the
efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH). The hypothesis states in its
most generalized version that in any market in which information flows
without restraint current market prices reflect investors' collective beliefs
about the value of the goods that are being traded. While ECMH can be
applied to any market that satisfies its conditions and has frequently been
applied to commodities markets,151 its main impact has been in the analysis
of stock market pricing. The ECMH comes in three versions: weak,
semistrong, and strong. The weak version states that current prices reflect
all the information contained from observations of previous investment
prices. As a result, historical pricing information is not useful for predicting
future pricing, making so-called "technical" analysis from price movements
useless as a predictor of future prices. Under the semistrong version
current prices reflect all public information, including technical information
but also information pertaining to "fundamentals," which is information
about the performance and prospects of a firm, its assets and liabilities,
P/E ratio, and the like. If you learn something about a firm in the
newspaper the market price has already reflected that news and trading on
149. Louis Bachelier, The Theory of Speculation [1900] (reprint edition,
Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).
150. See Holbrook Working, A Random Difference Series for Use in the
Analysis of Time Series, 29 J. Am.Statistical Assn. 11 (1934) (stock prices
appeared to move randomly, making technical forecasting impossible); Alfred
Cowles, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast, 5 Econometrica 309 (1933)
(concluding that professional stock pickers did not do better than a random walk in
selecting stocks for their clients); Alfred Cowles and H.E. Jones, Some A Posteriori
Probabilities in Stock market Action, 5 Econometrica 280 (1937) (similar). See
Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series, 96 J.Royal Statistical
Soc. 11 (1953) (similar).
151. E.g., Roger W. Gray and David J.S. Rutledge, The Economics of
Commodity Futures Markets: A Survey, 39 Rev.Marketing Agricultural Econ. 3
(1972).
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it is of no use. Further, there is no point studying a firm's fundamentals in
order to identify under- or over-valued stocks. Thus neither technical
analysis nor fundamental analysis will work. Finally, the strong form adds
to this that even private information is discounted into the stock price. As a
result even information from such activities as insider trading will be
included.152
Both the strong and the semistrong strong version of EMCH have
strong policy implications for corporate disclosure and finance. Principally,
the mitigate strongly against hard regulation, although in favor of disclosure
of information.153 With respect to information, mandatory disclosure is
more important for smaller companies than for larger publicly traded
companies that are likely to be followed by a large number of analysts.154
In general, the amount of regulation of information that should be supplied
varies inversely with the amount of information actually available and
disseminated by private analysts.155 Finally, the type of financing a firm
chooses, or its production or expansion decisions will always be reflected
in the market price, thus making command-and-control regulation largely
unnecessary.156
152. See Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Jeffery F. Jaffe,
Corporate Finance 352-57 (7th ed. 2005).
153. See Charles R. Plott, Markets as Information Gathering Tools, 67
S.Econ.J. 1, 9-10 (2000).
The Supreme Court approved what amounted to the semistrong form of
ECMH in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). It had been applied
previously in many circuits. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). On the Basic litigation and the reaction,
see Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 660-665 (3d ed. 2003). On
this history of the fraud on the market hypothesis in litigation prior to Basic, see
Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a
Theory, 52 Alb.L.Rev. 923 1989).
154. See Jeffrey N. Gordon and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 761, 810-811
(1985).
155. Ibid.
156. Further, the Modigliani-Miller theorem shows that in a perfectly
functioning capital market with no transaction costs the value of a firm is
independent of its ratio of debt to equity. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H.
Miller, The Cost of Capital, note __.
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Conclusion: the Separation of Ownership and Awareness:
The result of marginalist finance theory was to take Berle and
Means' separation of corporate ownership and control one step further, to
the separation of ownership and awareness. In an efficient capital market
investors can maximize their returns without even knowing anything about
the products a firm makes or the markets in which it operates. A random
selection of stocks produces the same return as the most careful
research.157 Indeed, under the strong version of ECMH even the actions of
managers become irrelevant because they will immediately be reflected in
the stock price as well. The effect was to move the shareholder in the
publicly traded corporation to the furthest extent possible from the
nineteenth century vision of the classical corporation as a device for limiting
liability and facilitating investment by a group of active owner-operators.

157. See Donald R. Stabile, Forerunners of Modern Financial Economics: A
Random Walk in the History of Economic Thought, 1900-1950 (2005).

